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Joerg Fingerhut*
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This paper argues that the still-emerging paradigm of situated cognition requires a
more systematic perspective on media to capture the enculturation of the human
mind. By virtue of being media, cultural artifacts present central experiential models
of the world for our embodied minds to latch onto. The paper identifies references
to external media within embodied, extended, enactive, and predictive approaches to
cognition, which remain underdeveloped in terms of the profound impact that media
have on our mind. To grasp this impact, I propose an enactive account of media
that is based on expansive habits as media-structured, embodied ways of bringing
forth meaning and new domains of values. We apply such habits, for instance, when
seeing a picture or perceiving a movie. They become established through a process of
reciprocal adaptation between media artifacts and organisms and define the range of
viable actions within such a media ecology. Within an artifactual habit, we then become
attuned to a specific media work (e.g., a TV series, a picture, a text, or even a city)
that engages us. Both the plurality of habits and the dynamical adjustments within a
habit require a more flexible neural architecture than is addressed by classical cognitive
neuroscience. To detail how neural and media processes interlock, I will introduce the
concept of neuromediality and discuss radical predictive processing accounts that could
contribute to the externalization of the mind by treating media themselves as generative
models of the world. After a short primer on general media theory, I discuss media
examples in three domains: pictures and moving images; digital media; architecture and
the built environment. This discussion demonstrates the need for a new cognitive media
theory based on enactive artifactual habits—one that will help us gain perspective on
the continuous re-mediation of our mind.
Keywords: 4E cognition, architecture, artifactual habits, digital media, film, neuromediality, picture perception,
predictive processing
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INTRODUCTION
Media are the core currency of culture. Alongside images,
texts, and sounds, new varieties of media (especially in digital
form) profoundly shape human “pattern practices” (Roepstorff
et al., 2010) across cultural domains. In these contexts, situated
cognition is well-placed to examine how sociocultural niches
scaffold and structure the mind. Yet paradoxically, media
phenomena do not occupy a central place within the discourse
on situated cognition. In this paper, I propose an understanding
of our engagement with media artifacts based on a theory of
habits. To explain such habits, I take my cue from enactivism
and recent theories of embodied or radical predictive processing
(Clark, 2013, 2015a). I demonstrate how such an understanding
is needed to capture the disparate ways media artifacts engage us
with their experiential models of the world. I center artifacts as
an object of study due to their status as the most quintessential
and enduring manifestations of human culture. Exploring a
systematic media perspective about such artifacts ought to inform
(and form an integral part of) situated cognition accounts
of enculturation.
Enculturation is commonly understood as the acquisition
of cognitive practices within sociocultural niches, covering
ontogenetic levels of dynamic change that unfold across
a lifespan. Such ontogenetic niches have been the focus
in cognitive science and will be the focus of the present
paper as well, as it mostly deals with media in what
has been labeled “developmental” or “cognitive niches”
(Stotz, 2010; Bertolotti and Magnani, 2017). Given its
discussion of cultural evolution and cultural development,
theoretical discourse on enculturation constitutes a significant
addition to embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive
(4E) cognitive science (Hutchins, 2011). Accounts for
enculturation claim that “culturally mediated worlds in
which we grow up and live are integral to how our brains
achieve their functional capability” (Kirmayer et al., 2020,
p. 6). This occurs holistically. For example, “cognitive
integration” theories link the acquisition and entrainment
of capacities for calculation to wider practices that encompass
epistemic tools and representational systems within a culture
(Menary, 2007, 2018).
While such accounts are theoretically invaluable, they
typically focus on higher-level cognitive capacities (at least
when considering paradigm cases). This includes capacities
that are only made possible through cultural practices
(Hutchins, 2008), as well as specific epistemic operations
derived from certain tools and media. Among these are those
relating to the capacities of reading, writing, memory, and
mathematical cognition (Heyes, 2012; Menary, 2015; Fabry,
2018). Such accounts are not immediately concerned with
broader questions regarding cultural tools and media, such
as how they might afford novel, experiential models of the
world. Moreover, the field does not sufficiently engage with
human artifacts and media beyond notational systems and
language. Other cultural artifacts, such as images and films,
new and digital media, and the built environment, could be
considered as equally central and pervasive insofar as they
substantively structure our cognitive lives—they even permeate
our perception and affectivity. By focusing on how we enact
such artifacts, this paper aims beyond a single cognitive
practice (made possible by the processes of enculturation)
to explore how experiential domains are generated through
embodied media habits.
Although the cognitive sciences routinely consult the
theoretical traditions of philosophy and psychology, they often
overlook relevant theoretical work in fields such as image
science and media studies. This is unfortunate because media
studies, especially, could be an important humanities companion
to 4E cognitive science. As a field, media studies elucidates
the inner operations and logics of different media systems.
In doing so, it reveals the relevance of media’s technological
dimensions to our lives. After all, media are artifacts that
expand our cognitive and experiential reach beyond traditional
conceptions of the human senses. Media record, process, and
transmit information. As media studies have shown, these
basic operations developed over history in different cultural-
technological niches and became implemented in specific forms.
The prominent field of media archeology, for example, traces
the trajectories of technological devices such as the typewriter,
film, and computers (Kittler, 1999). Media theories therefore
emphasize the material and technological underpinnings of
media (Gane, 2005) while also showing how media amount
to more than that. As Kittler asserts, “media determine our
situation” (Kittler, 1999, p. xxxix). The guiding premise for
the present paper, then, is that both 4E cognition and media
studies capture the ways in which cultural artifacts shape our
lives and minds.
I argue that the embodied habits and skills employed when
engaging cultural artifacts constitute a central level of description
(Fingerhut, 2020a). Habits are ways of acting. As such, they
structure our perceptions, emotions, and thoughts. Habits are
also expansive in three aspects: time, space, and the sphere
of activity they afford. (a) Habits assemble tacit expectations
within certain ecologies and therefore structure our future actions
therein. Since those expectations have been shaped over time,
habits link our current engagements also with our history of
environmental coupling. In other words, they are temporally
expansive. (b) Habits are co-constituted by our socio-cultural-
technical environment, making them locationally expansive in
the sense that, for example, media artifacts critically determine
the way an engagement unfolds within a habit. (c) Interestingly,
habits (which are often seen as exhibiting an inherent inertia)
further exhibit a tendency to transcend themselves. They do so by
adapting to novel circumstances or by unlocking new domains of
interaction. This means they are transformatively expansive.
More specifically, this paper will explore the sensorimotor
and body-schematic processes underlying artifactual habits with
respect to pictures and cinematic productions—along with new
(social and digital) media as well as the built environment (the
lasting impact of which is re-mediated in our smart cities).
Clearly, the processes constituting a habit are more complex and
varied than such a focus can reveal. Higher cognitive processes
also play a central role in the unfolding of skillful engagement, as
is addressed by so-called ‘vertical elements’ in meshed architecture
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accounts of skills (Christensen et al., 2016). Such processes go
beyond the scope of the present paper, for its focus is not
so much cognitive control but rather to what extent control
over experiential engagement—in a more bottom-up fashion—
is exerted by the medium and the interaction itself (Gallagher
and Varga, 2020). The general emphasis is on medium-specific
habits (i.e., how media habits differ from one another and how
they are adaptive in specific media ecologies), the ways pervasive
artifacts permeate our cognitive engagement down to the level of
perception and affect (think of the impact of architecture, film,
digital media), and how this pans out in encounters with specific
media works (i.e., how we attune to media and how they entrain
us in the here and now). With this emphasis, we can identify
central elements of our engagement with the experiential models
presented to us by media.
The first section of this paper briefly surveys some
4E cognition accounts that reference media to provide an
understanding of the nature of the mental states that emerge
when media engage human organisms. One focus will be the
hybrid realization claims of the extended mind. Another focus
will be the enactive nature of our mental states and the evaluative
domains such an enactivism entails. I will subscribe to an
enactive account of habits that highlights the active role of
the body in bringing forth experiences with the purpose to
extend this idea to media ecologies. Yet I will also discuss how
this account can retain a focus on the hybrid material nature
of the brain-body-nexus underlying such engagements and its
structure (in broadly functionalist terms), which some variants
of enactivism might reject.
The second section addresses the role of the brain in our
media engagements more directly. Understanding the way our
neuronal processes dovetail with media on different levels of the
hierarchical processing of the brain (along with how this relates
to the way information is recorded, processed, and transmitted in
different media) could be taken up by radical predictive processing
theories (Clark, 2013, 2015a). These theories give an account
of the role that so-called designer environments (and media,
in my understanding) play in the dynamics between the brain,
body, and world. My focus here will be on active inference and
design-guided bodily engagement. Within a habit, then, we can
identify neuromedial elements that complement the unfolding
of a media engagement. Such a framework presents itself as
a theory of media as central experiential models of the world
that need not be mirrored in the brain, but rather engage the
brain-body nexus.
Section three recounts this idea and relates the situated mind
to a general media theory. All this has implications for how we
should conceive of our more specific media engagements. Section
four therefore discusses examples of media engagement types
(exploring also the mental states realized within an artifactual
habit) and prepares the grounds for a new cognitive media theory
based on what has been discussed before. It then associates these
types to the medium-specific body schema we employ when
engaging with film, to the capacity of seeing-in with respect to
pictorial artifacts, to the ways new and digital media actively
engage and predict their users, and – last but not least – to the
understanding of the built environment as a media environment.
SITUATING MEDIA IN THEORIES OF THE
MIND
Philosophy of mind is media theory. This is true in a general
and rather trivial sense. What reaches our mind is mediated
by our body-brain nexus and habits of interacting with the
environment that we have acquired over time. Within a relational,
situated philosophy of mind, the central function of the brain
is one of a “mediating organ” (Fuchs, 2011). This organ
facilitates engagements between an agent and the world, with
those engagements themselves now gaining center stage for an
understanding of the mind. But what seems trivially true does not
translate easily into a theory. This is because a media perspective
could erroneously suggest that the mind is a receiver that exists
outside of the mediating apparatus—a position I argue against. In
the following paragraphs, I will not explore the general concept
of mediation, though, but rather focus on the role that external
media play in situated cognition accounts and that might shed a
light on the relational nature of our mind.1
A Mixed-Media, Deterritorialized
Cognitive Science
External media have been most prominently referenced in
theories of the extended mind (EM). These theories argue
that media artifacts, whether a handwritten notebook or an
iPhone, could be taken as literal parts of the machinery that
realizes mental states (under specific circumstances, such as
the reliability, trustworthiness, and accessibility of the external
device). Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) perennial thought example
describes a notebook taking over the memory function of the
brain of an Alzheimer’s patient named Otto, substituting what
would otherwise be carried out by neural realizers in healthy
individuals. Beliefs therefore supervene upon a hybrid brain-
artifact structure in Otto.2
In other writings, Clark emphasizes that external structures
may not gain a central role in co-constituting cognition if they did
not significantly complement what the brain-body nexus can do
on its own: “external structures function so as to complement our
individual cognitive profiles and to diffuse human reason across
wider and wider social and physical networks whose collective
computations exhibit their own special dynamics and properties
[emphasis added]” (Clark, 1997, p. 179, 1998). Sutton (2010),
who refers to such accounts as “second wave” EM, spearheads
exograms (Donald, 1991) and the idea of exosomatic memory
to drive home the point of complementarity. This latter notion
1As such, media concepts have already helped to structure some central debates in
analytical philosophy of mind and consciousness. These include discussion of the
analog or digital content of mental states, Dennett’s rejection of any identifiable or
special neural medium of consciousness, and his claim that consciousness is “fame
in the brain” unbound from any specific medium (Dennett, 1993, 2001). Clearly,
media theorizing can be fruitful for a heuristic of the mind. However, this paper is
more immediately concerned with external media and the role they might play in
constituting mental states.
2Much has been said about the extent to which inner neural and outer media
processes must have similar processing properties to warrant parity of treatment.
For a recent take on this, see Wheeler (2019). For a critical view on whether this
introduces a mark of the mental based on properties of inner processing, see Di
Paolo (2009).
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is also core to aforementioned “cognitive integration” theories.3
Exograms are external media storage devices, such as written
books, images, libraries, databases. These devices do not simply
mimic neuronal memory processes (engrams). Instead, they
exhibit properties that inner processes typically lack: reliance,
transmittability, reorganization, and so on. It is therefore the
combination of inner and outer formats that was beneficial in
such cases and which enables the human mind, as compared to
a species exhibiting a more limited range of such combinations,
to achieve novel and exciting things.
As the hybrid structures of EM suggest, mixing media might
generally be advantageous. Clark (2019) refers to DeepMind
or Differentiable Neural Computers, which are highly evolved
machine learning systems. These successfully perform tasks by
employing a so-called read-write unit that enables them to
externalize certain processes in a different media format (by
writing them out), thus giving them sensorimotor access to
stable yet modifiable external storage elements (Clark, 2019,
p. 272). This describes a cognitive solution that uses engrams
and exograms alike. Such an artificial system might seem a rather
alien example (albeit one that gains significance when we think
of the effects of AI, ubiquitous computing, and the digitalization
of our life world). Yet the example demonstrates how mixed
systems, understood as one media system exploiting another,
jointly constitute better cognitive solutions.
Sutton suggests also a third wave of EM: for human brain-
body-artifact interaction we could consider dynamic “shifting
networks of heterogeneous components temporarily clustered
or clumped together in contingent coalescence” (Sutton, 2010,
p. 194). This has further consequence for how we should study
cognition:
If there is to be a distinct third wave of EM, it might
be a deterritorialized cognitive science which deals with the
propagation of deformed and reformatted representations, and
which dissolves individuals into peculiar loci of coordination and
coalescence among multiple structured media [emphasis added].
(Sutton, 2010, p. 213).
With such a wave, we would study series of transformations
occurring in interactions between human organisms and artifacts
as temporal integrations. These integrations allow for de- and
reformations as part of the cognitive process, before then
fading out again.
Given the perspective on media proposed here (as a
description of how we attune to media), it is tempting to follow
a third wave of EM that highlights fleeting “soft” or “transient
assemblies” (Clark, 1997, pp. 42–45, 2016, p. 150). This is
because the cognizing organism need not be the center of control
nor the sole focus when it comes to the kind of information
processing involved. The organism also cannot claim agency in
such assemblies (Kirchhoff, 2012). Consider smartphones and the
other touchscreen devices that we carry around with us: they
entrain us when we watch a video, for example, by providing a
3See Menary (2007). For the human organism, the benefits of cognitive integration
is that it enables us to do things “we otherwise could not do and [in] the
transformation of existing abilities, making us smarter and better at difficult and
demanding cognitive tasks” (Menary, 2018, p. 197).
filmic exploration within a respective media-specific succession
of frames (aided by sound and music). Yet they can also re-direct
us to their surfaces, such as when we receive a message. Whether
in entrainment or in the switching of attention, the activity
is elicited and structured by the multi-media device. Similarly,
consider how so-called smart cities of today aim to engage us
(often also via screen-based media): they steer our movements
and elicit cognitive processes by nudging our behavior and using
their own algorithms to engage us (they do so more actively than
traditional architecture, which already engages us by guiding our
embodied exploration of space).
These examples make obvious that something else might be
required beyond transient assemblies. In order to capture more
fully the nature of our media engagements, we need to identify
the central constraints that determine a specific kind of media
engagement. We therefore have to focus on recurring media
or artifact coalescences and the ensuing structured interactions
they elicit. While it is true that an encompassing theory of
enculturation also has to understand what it means for real-
time coalitions of organism and artifact to mix and dovetail, it
is as central to relate such media-mixing and reformatting of
information to the more enduring habits sustained in specific
media ecologies. Those habits determine our engagement with
pictures, screen-based media, and the built environment, etc.
Rather than therefore fully deterritorializing cognition (as third
wave EM seems to suggest), this rather requires an enhanced
focus on the cultural contexts that provide structure along with
the recurring ways pervasive artifacts entrain us. What therefore
is required is the mapping of multiple (often dormant) skills and
habits that are constantly re-activated and re-negotiated upon
exposure to a media environment, which I will address below.4
None of the above waves of EM amount to a theory of
cognition on their own. Instead, they present some arguments
that should inoculate us against simply assuming that cognitive
processes are confined to the skull and skin and exclusively
realized in a specific neural medium. The hybrid realization view
of EM has relevance for the present paper as an epistemic claim:
by giving up the focus on the locally instantiated brain-body,
cognitive science should be rewarded with extra explanatory
power and parsimony. We can track how in certain media
engagements, organism and artifact jointly explore a content. The
brain does not have to mirror the operations of the medium,
but simply to latch onto them (as I will explore in section “The
Radically Predictive Brain”). With respect to mental states such as
beliefs, EM attributes a co-constitutive role to external media. But
the hybrid realization view that underlies this move also connects
with a broad functionalist commitment in EM (Wheeler, 2012).
This commitment is not shared by other Es, as we will see shortly
with respect to enactivism. They claim that what is central to
4The dynamic exploitations of different media across brain-body-culture
boundaries then unfold within such habitual engagements. This paper takes up
the differences between media-habits as well as the rules of engagement within a
habit (i.e., the specific unfolding of cognitive processes within a skill). I will not
focus on what could be considered our meta-habits of (wittingly or unwittingly)
choosing different media resources for engagement. Still, the latter has become a
central focus in understanding media economies that compete for our attentional
resources (Crogan and Kinsley, 2012).
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cognition is not captured well by a computational description
of information-processing (and thoroughly misrepresented when
relying on representations).
Another well-known challenge to EM comes from internalists
such as Adams and Aizawa (2001). This challenge grants that
extra-bodily elements may indeed cause cognitive processes, but
that we cannot infer constitution from causation. For our media
cases, the question is: do operations outside the organism co-
constitute the exploration and bringing forth of world models
(such as sensorimotor loops structured by the filmic medium or
those co-processed by artificial computations in virtual reality
setting)? Or is it that the brain only causally depends on
such media-body-brain couplings and rather the more local
brain-body nexus realizes cognition? It is worth noting that
cognitive media theorists who subscribe to 4E claims highlight
the transformation of cognitive capacities through media (such
as extended empathy in film; Smith, 2012; see also section
“Seeing-in Pictures”) and the centrality of embodied engagement
(Nannicelli, 2019). Yet they mostly do so without assuming a
literal extension of cognitive processes into the media artifacts we
engage with, as EM would have it. According to such theorists,
cognitive capacities and affective relations are still realized locally
within an embodied agent.
The present paper does not focus on boundary definitions
for cognitive systems. Also, specific media may pose additional
challenges to an EM account for media interactions.5 Yet I will
return to some of those issues when discussing artifactual habits
that are locationally expansive. There, I argue that a parsimonious
theoretical assessment of certain media engagements captures
organism and media as jointly exploring and bringing forth
meaning or even models of the world. In any case, under the
concept of habit otherwise seemingly disjointed processes (inner-
organic and media processes) can be understood as unified
(Fingerhut, 2020a). Although I do not focus on ontological claims
regarding constitution and causality, I want to at least hint at a
(in my view) promising way to challenge previous renderings of
constitution. This could be accomplished by including dynamical
and reciprocal causality between organisms and environment as
part of what counts as constitution (Kirchhoff, 2015).6 I generally
agree with such accounts, which argue that the diachronic
element of our history of engaging with artifacts (captured by the
temporal expansiveness of habits) also has some bearing on the
locational expansiveness of a mental state, as I will address below.
Enactivism and Domains of Value
As I argue in this paper, media engage us in an active exploration.
A mainstay of enactivism is that perception and experience
5The exploration of a scene in film, for example, relies on camera work and editing
processes that have happened in the past. The perceiving subject is thus an active
partaker in the succession of frames in the here and now, yet also a passive perceiver
in terms of the many past operational decisions that they cannot influence. For
discussion of pictorial artifacts in this respect, see Fingerhut (2014).
6Most EM theorists assume local, neural realizers when it comes to conscious
mental states (and argue only for the extended nature of non-occurrent mental
states, such as beliefs), whereas the dynamic-reciprocal accounts just mentioned
also prominently address the unfolding of conscious experiences. Such accounts
also encompass cultural phenomena (such as architectural contexts) that fall under
the purview of what I call media (Kirchhoff and Kiverstein, 2019, 2020).
should primarily be understood as the activity of an organism.
At the core of the enactivist approach (Varela et al., 1991;
Thompson, 2007; Di Paolo and Thompson, 2014) lies the idea
that we should understand all cognition as meaning-making
against the backdrop of self-organized autonomous systems and
their structured interactions with the environment they bring
forth. Enactivism therefore unfolds around the concept of the
metabolic organism and the autonomous self. It claims similar
principles hold for single cells in their chemical environments,
bodies-plus-tools in more evolved organisms, and human agents
in social settings. The autonomous, living body is nonetheless
at the heart of such accounts, which are organism-centered and
that model cognitive activity in terms of its relevance to the
viability of an organism. “Cognition, in its most general form, is
sense-making—the adaptive regulation of states and interactions
by an agent with respect to the consequences for the agent’s
own viability” (Di Paolo and Thompson, 2014, p. 76). Here,
cognition is understood as a temporally extended dynamic and
as an ongoing adaptive regulation.
The central cognitive activity is sense-making. This activity
captures what we do when we bring forth meaning. Within such a
concept, environment and organism can be seen as occupying co-
constitutive roles (Thompson and Stapleton, 2009). The history
of structural coupling between organism and environment leads
to a form of convergence between the two, defining also what
an organism is sensitive to in its environment.7 Adaptivity is
therefore also centrally interwoven with the sense-making of an
autonomous system, in which it tracks whether environmental
conditions are beneficial or detrimental for its viability (Di
Paolo, 2005; Di Paolo and Thompson, 2014). The mutual
co-determination of organism and environment occurs on
evolutionary and ontogenetic timespans. But crucially, it is also is
present in the immediate dynamics of the here and now. The latter
is highlighted, for instance, in theories of “participatory sense-
making” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007). Whereas some earlier
accounts of autonomy-based enactivism focused on coupling
with the environment mostly from the viewpoint of the organism,
participatory sense-making gives socially negotiated cognition
center stage—dispensing with the idea that relevant cognitive
activity originates solely from a single organism.
Individual and interactive levels here are mutually enabling.
Recent enactive accounts of language can be additionally seen
as a media related extension of participatory sense-making.
These accounts reference a central cultural domain within
the human social niche: “linguistic sensitivities are the result
of the specific contingencies and ecological co-constitution of
our bodily existence in human worlds” (Cuffari et al., 2015,
p. 1199). Yet despite this interest in the ecological constitution
via “languaging” (Di Paolo et al., 2018), such accounts ignore
7By highlighting affordances for action within the environment, ecological
psychology (Gibson, 1979) shares several tenets with enactive perception; the
terminology of ‘affordances’ is thus used across theoretical boundaries. Ecological
psychology comes with a set of further theoretical commitments that are not
central to what I do in the present paper; I thus do not discuss overlaps
and differences between ecological psychology and enactivism. For some recent
discussions of this, see Ramstead et al. (2016), Crippen (2020), and Feiten (2020).
See also section “Neuromediality and Media Affordances” below.
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both the printed word and the use of language in other media
systems as a factor in developing those linguistic sensitivities.
Media (e.g., film, screen-based digital media, and printed words)
entrain us in ways that are quite different compared to those
of embodied, social languaging encounters ‘in the wild.’ But
both the specific capabilities we develop with respect to these
media along with ways language capabilities might transfer across
media boundaries and into participatory sense-making constitute
central questions for a media-informed enactivism.
This paper emphasizes the generation, sustaining, and active
perception of values within an environment in structural
coupling, by focusing on such coupling in media environments.
Although the living body is a central reference point for
enactivism, the enacted environmental loop it undergoes largely
determines which mental state we entertain at a certain
moment. That is what I will focus on by disclosing the
sensorimotor and body-schematic dimensions of enactive sense-
making in media contexts. As certain versions of what has been
labeled sensorimotor enactivism argue, entertaining an auditory
experience (to take just one example) differs from a visual
experience based on the mastery regarding patterns of regularity
between motor acts and sensory feedback (O’Regan and Noë,
2001). Both experiences differ, for example, from a thought in
terms of the type of access to the world that they provide (Noë,
2009). From here, it is a small step to argue that media-sources
engage us in media-specific loops with their own forms of access
(Noë, 2012; Fingerhut, 2014).
Sensorimotor enactivism has been criticized for unnecessarily
relying on (inner) knowledge with respect to the mastery
of aforementioned regularities (Hutto, 2005). Despite this
difference regarding knowledge, autopoietic and sensorimotor
enactivism both agree that mental states cannot be fully
captured by functional descriptions (of so-called knowledge
obtained by the organism, or even in terms of the functional
structures determining bodily loops through the environment).
Enactivism could therefore be seen as highlighting the dynamic
interactions with the environment more directly (Hutto and
Myin, 2020). The specific unfoldings of such interactions is a
central component of theories of participatory sense-making
and has also been captured by the concept of “attunement”
in enactive interpretations of skilled performance theories
(Gallagher and Varga, 2020).
Enactivism claims additionally that the ability to generate
and sustain values in our environment has to be part of a
theory of cognition, proper. This also explains why enactivism
relates to EM rather critically (Di Paolo, 2009). The functionalist
descriptions that EM brings to bear in capturing mental states
(e.g., our beliefs as brain-body-artifact hybrids) are based on
the wrong model of the mind. It lacks reference to meaning-
making—namely, to the body as a self-individuating system
interacting with the environment (Di Paolo, 2009; Di Paolo
and Thompson, 2014). Those differences can be unpacked
in various ways. One main difference is that the continuous
dynamic of regulating and adapting the body in sense-making
also entails a concept of value and affectivity that other theories
lack (Colombetti, 2017). Such values are sustained at different
levels. These include the body in self-regulation, the body
in sensorimotor coupling, and the body in intersubjective
engagement (Thompson and Varela, 2001; Thompson, 2007;
Di Paolo et al., 2018).8 Cultural artifacts and media latch
onto our bodies with respect to all three modes. For instance,
clothing and the built environment alter our self-regulatory
processes significantly by providing heat and shelter. Pictures
and moving images engage us in a sensorimotor coupling that
differs from engagement with depicted scenes in the flesh.
They thereby enable us to attribute a different system of values
to those scenes. Digital media, in turn, constantly alter our
social interactions. Generally, by co-constituting domains of
interaction, media embody meaning. This is because they have
become part and parcel of the strategies by which the human body
engages the world.
While functionalist descriptions cannot fully account for
the generation and sustaining of values, I would argue pace
enactivism that when it comes to the tracking of such values,
neuronal mechanisms and bodily sensitivities that enable such
tracking constitute a central level of description.9 Cognitive
neuroscience might therefore capture how our visual system
interlocks in perceptual engagements with certain artifacts
(how, e.g., a film entrains us). Theories of emotions, in
particular, might explain how specific emotional states track
values in our environment based on embodied profiles that
afford specific kinds of cognitive processing (Prinz, 2004;
Fingerhut and Prinz, 2020, forthcoming). When it comes to
cultural domains and media, one should think, moreover, of
regulatory principles and norms for our bodies to sustain
that go beyond avoiding harm and satisfying the need for
food or shelter. Our bodies, for instance, might be seen as
exhibiting a need for information and exploration. This is
exemplified in the affective states of interest and curiosity,
which might explain the pleasure we take in a wide variety
of domains including media (Biederman and Vessel, 2006).
We might therefore also think of further affective and
aesthetic engagements that media afford, such as wonder and
play, through which we track what we value in the arts
(Fingerhut and Prinz, 2018).
Artifactual Habits
Enactivism argues that we bring forth experiences by engaging
with the world and others. Such active engagements differ
substantially when we engage with a social scene in a film or
explore the world as it is depicted in a photograph. Different
pervasive artifacts and media contexts might also have led to the
emergence of different bodies (or body-schematic processes) that
we bring to bear in such media ecologies. Walking through the
built environment of a city, for instance, requires a set of bodily
8Although it could be argued that the sensorimotor enactivism of O’Regan and
Noë (2001) does not centrally capture this reference to affective states and the
autonomous body in need of coupling (Fingerhut, 2012).
9In this sense I would argue that it remains explanatory necessary to identify
specific structures in the brain-body-world nexus (i.e., in artifacts and human
bodies) that jointly realize those loops, while at the same time retaining the
possibility that cognition in the relational sense might have no location proper (see
for an excellent critical discussion of this: Walter, 2014).
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engagements different from the one we employ when seeing a
movie in a cinema setting.
By directing attention toward what can be called ‘artifactual
habits of exploration,’ I aim to capture the salient differences
between those situations. This paper argues that human cognizers
are constituted by a plurality of habits that bring forth
their own domains of interactions and respective ranges of
viability. Habits are structured ways of acting and central loci
of meaning-making. It is only when something has either
entered into a pattern or is registered as a violation of
such a pattern that it becomes meaningful to an organism.
The rest is noise. As pragmatist philosophy in particular has
acknowledged, habits can therefore be seen as the basic building
blocks of the mind: “the medium of habit filters all the
material that reaches our perception and thought” (Dewey, 1983,
p. 26).10
For the present paper, it is central that certain habits
can be described as mixed media affairs between bodies and
artifacts. This links them to the debate regarding the extended
mind and they therefore can be captured by one meaning
of expansiveness identified earlier. The bodily interaction that
pertains to a habit is co-determined by the media artifact.
In other words, the engagement unfolds according to media-
specific processes. The habit is then re-instantiated each time
the brain-body-media coalition is formed. Habits are locationally
expansive in this sense and in their reliance on external structures
of the designed environment, of cultural artifacts, and of
media more generally.
Habits also share the quality of being temporally expansive.
This means they bring our history of environmental coupling
to the here and now. They thus structure our actions and
determine our tacit expectations with respect to a domain
(Fingerhut, 2020a). In many ways, habits are comparable
to skills. For the purposes of this paper, habits and skills
largely function as interchangeable concepts. But in contrast
to skills (Fridland, 2017; Hipólito et al., 2020), habits do
not require the same level of control in their development.
Moreover, they can be acquired and molded simply through
exposure and implicit statistical learning. The temporal
expansiveness of habits nonetheless exceeds any concept of
repetition: “rather than being the repetition of action, habit
is characterized as the open and adaptive way in which the
body learns to cope with familiar situations” (Miyahara et al.,
2020, p. 125).
Habits are not merely rigid mechanical routines. Rather,
they constitute flexible ways of world-making and capture
how human cognition may be cultural tout court: cultural
contexts, artifacts, and media latch on to existing modes of
perceiving and affective engagement, moving them toward
new forms. As such, artifactual habits constitute an interactive
domain between organism and environment. Given this, they
are determined as much by external media as they are by
the activities of the organism. This relates to the third aspect
of expansiveness. Artifactual or media habits are proven to
10For an excellent overview on current pragmatist theorizing on habits, see
Caruana and Testa (2020).
be transformatively expansive: they generate new patterns of
interactions and domains of value in the process of reciprocal
adaptation between organism and cultural environment. Some
propensity to pick up and integrate new patterns must obtain
on the side of the organism (i.e., as an enabling condition), yet
artifacts, media, social environments play the more active role
in driving such transformations. Technical innovations force us
to learn new skills; statistical immersion within new (typically
urban) environments or new social media may alter our habits of
interpersonal engagement; and finally, cultural innovations and
especially the arts may challenge our habits of engagement in
various respects.
The account of habits proposed here portrays us as expert
performers in different media settings. Synthetic accounts
of skilled performance have already addressed some of the
competences this entails, along with the flexibility of habits
I envision, for other domains (Christensen et al., 2016). For
example, Gallagher and Varga (2020) describe a horizontal
axis involved in the joint performance of music. This axis
stands in opposition to a vertical one involving higher cognitive
processes interacting with bodily engagements. The horizontal
axis includes processes that “extend into the world, meshed with
the structures of our intercorporal and material engagements”
(Gallagher and Varga, 2020, p. 7). This is locational expansiveness,
to use my term. Understanding such attunements and the
dynamic, situated processes in performance studies (but also in
media context in which we turn out to be expert performers
with respect to media artifacts) could centrally inform our
understanding of situated cognition as those authors argue.
I discuss examples of media engagements more extensively
below, when I put the account of artifactual habits to work (see
section “Toward a New Cognitive Media Theory”). But to get
an idea, consider cinema. Edited Hollywood movies rely on us
exploring their content according to medium-specific patterns.
Some of these include specific camera and lens movements or
editing techniques that could involve switching perspectives to
portray a scene, or a montage to exemplify an idea. Movies
are designed by employing film techniques that have evolved
over time. Some of these techniques instill immersion in us
viewers, which seems to be a central aim of Hollywood cinema,
and engage us with configurations that entrain us with their
content (a situation, a scene) in specific sensorimotor or affective
ways. Despite feeling immersed in such situations it should be
clear that these engagements differ significantly from how we
could experience a situation or scene in the flesh. We might
not be aware of this anymore, but film is contingent upon on
us having integrated certain techniques of exploration into our
habits of seeing.
With respect to film (as opposed to static images or written
text), it is interesting how some of the activity of exploration
sides with the medium itself. Film theorists have aimed to capture
the ways we lend our body to the medium in such cases. In
the process of doing so, it has been argued that we engage a
“surrogate body” (Voss, 2011). One way to capture the embodied
engagement in these cases is by exploring a specific “filmic
body schema” that extends into the filmic realm and expresses
itself by engendering certain film-specific embodied engagements
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(Fingerhut and Heimann, 2017). Some initial thoughts might
help demonstrate the plausibility of such a concept. In film
viewing, our self-initiated, real-world related movements are
attenuated in ways that free up resources for an intensified
engagement with the cinematic works themselves experienced
as bodily engagement (i.e., with camera movements, editing,
perspectival change, as I will address in more detail below, section
“The Filmic Body Schema”).
THE ROLE OF THE BRAIN IN THE MEDIA
MIX
Neuromediality and Media Affordances
Above, I alluded to radical predictive processing (RPP). This
perspective weaves “designer environments” into a novel way to
understand the brain (Clark, 2015a, 2016). Predictive processing
theories generally agree that the central function of the brain is
to adjust the organism to its environment by using multileveled
probabilistic predictions. In RPP such inner models are seen as
action-oriented through and through. They have the function to
enable an efficient, and highly context-sensitive grip on structures
and scaffoldings in the environment by making “use of multiple,
fast, efficient, environmentally-exploitative, routes to action, and
response” (Clark, 2015a, p. 18).
In media ecologies, this grip takes on a specific, even more
interlocked nature, because media, among other things, have
been designed to engage and entrain us. Before going into some
of the details of such media engagements, it might be helpful
to account more generally for the contribution of the brain
in embodied media interactions by introducing the concept of
neuromediality. Such a concept aims to relate neural activity to
artifactual habits of perceiving. By highlighting processes that
correspond directly to media engagements, we can avoid falling
into a bio-, or socio-essentialism. Such essentialism treats media
as something that only impinges on a cognitive system, which
itself has evolved and developed in our every-day interactions
(e.g., either face to face with others or in the exposure to
natural objects) and interprets neural data in this way. Under the
proposed neuromedial perspective, neural responses can also be
seen as being exapted for media contexts. One aim is therefore to
identify neuronal contributions to new dimensions of interaction
that cultural artifacts, such as pictures and moving images, afford.
The pervasiveness of such media can be speculatively related to
the impact of other human artifacts on the brain, which has been
explored with respect to the organizational principle of “neural
reuse” that has been mostly explicated in relation to tool use
and language processing (Anderson, 2010; D’Errico and Colagè,
2018). To date, there are no comparably sophisticated accounts
for artifacts beyond language (such as depictions, which arguably
occupy a longstanding and central role in human cultures,
Brumm et al., 2021).
Notwithstanding such accounts of how neural circuitry
integrates new functions, it is generally important for a cognitive
science of media to build upon some normal conditions of
media-engagement that have developed ontogenetically through
experience-based learning and statistical immersion. This is true
not simply with respect to images, but also for film and TV,
the built environment, and digital media. Such considerations
will be instrumental in developing a theory of how artifactual
habits differ from each other and how an artifactual habit finds
expression in a specific media ecology or cultural environment.
They can also help map combinations of media components and
the neural-bodily resources on the organism side that they draw
on. In a second step, this approach can then address the question
of how the quality and content of an experience is determined
by habitual patterns of engagement (and the deviations from
the norms those habits track)—and how we enact a specific
picture, film, or novel.
What do we actually perceive when we engage with media? As
I argue, media provide models of the world that a cognizer can
latch onto in media-specific ways. Artifactual habits describe such
ways of enacting models. Yet it is not the model itself that shows
up in our consciousness. Instead, we perceive certain scenes in
the forms that pertain to different media (e.g., in pictures, films,
and novels), we engage with utterances of other people (e.g., in
social media), or we perceive opportunities to move (e.g., in the
built environment).
This relates to an understanding of our perceptual system
as geared to pick up opportunities to act, which is explored
in ecological psychology (see footnote 7). Concepts such as
“affordances 2.0” neatly capture how those opportunities to act
change dynamically in human-environment systems (Chemero,
2009, pp. 150–4). Here, environmental affordances for action
are not just properties available for pick-up to a pre-existing
body with specific sense organs (Gibson, 1979). Instead, cultural
niche and sensorimotor capabilities are constantly altered on
short timescales by human animals acting in these niches. It is
in this dynamic sense that affordances have also become a central
concept within recent theorizing about the cultural environment
and the enticements it contains (Withagen et al., 2012; Rietveld
and Kiverstein, 2014).11
With respect to different media, then, one could argue that
affordances correspond to habits or skills that are the topic
of this paper. These central, media-related affordances have to
be theoretically modeled in terms of the media-related habits
that correspond to them. For example, a depicted door is
perceived as walk-through-able in a way that is different from
a door in a building. Insofar as media expand our sensory
system and co-structure our habits of perception, they also
generate new affordances. This pertains to how affordances
differ systematically across media habits (e.g., the differences
between watching a movie, reading a text, or engaging in a
social media chat). Another question is how affordances are
dynamically modulated within a media engagement. The concept
of ‘interaction-dominant dynamics’ describes one such dynamic
between media artifacts and the brain-body nexus—one that
captures how an explorative activity is guided by a media
ecology. It has been argued, for instance, that the mouse-
computer system entrains the user into a certain pattern of
11For sociocultural affordances in social relations, see Ramstead et al. (2016). For
social affordances in digital media, see Fox and McEwan (2017). For affordances in
architecture, see Jelić et al. (2016) and Djebbara et al. (2021).
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action (Dotov et al., 2010, p. 3). In such cases, neural activity is
modulated by the sensorimotor-artifact dynamics of the larger
system. This includes switches in processing that could enable
the peripersonal space (Làdavas, 2002) of the engaging organism
to extend into the virtual environment of the computer screen
(Bassolino et al., 2010). After such a switch, the receptive field of
certain neurons changes significantly. Objects within the virtual
space take on a different presence and the organism engages in a
different cognitive processing style. Such kinds of entrainments
might even be more intense in new media devices such as
virtual reality (VR), where they are used for motor-cognitive
neurorehabilitation (Perez-Marcos et al., 2018), yet they can be
traced for other media as well.
The point I want to make is of a general nature: understanding
different media requires a focus on how media structure our
engagement with the worlds we are presented with. We need a
view of the brain as sustaining a dynamic and flexible neuro-
cognitive architecture (i.e., one that switches between and locks
into different media). Here, as before, I suggest the utility of the
concept of neuromedial processes for denoting the contribution
of the brain in such dynamics without giving it exclusive
importance in defining the structure of the relationship to
mediated worlds. The way certain media store, process, and
transmit information makes them specific model-environments
that pre-structure such relations for the human organism. It is—
or should be—the task of an enactive theory of media to highlight
how we attune to such models and what we can do within them.
The Radically Predictive Brain
I suggest capturing the dynamic and flexible cognitive
architecture in media engagements by philosophical predictive
modeling accounts. Clark’s action-oriented version, labeled
radical predictive processing (RPP), focuses on the role of the
brain in recruiting resources for action (Clark, 2013, 2015a,b,
2016). He provides a theory of the neural system as engaging in
active self-organizing dynamics that also could make salient how
the active body becomes recruited by designer environments that
themselves constitute central models for our mind.
The general idea of predictive coding (PC) is that in
terms of perception, cognition, and action, the computational
contribution of the brain involves providing a multilayered
system that produces predictions or hypotheses about the world.
The brain reduces uncertainty about its environment by engaging
in “prediction error minimization” (Friston and Kiebel, 2009;
Friston, 2010; Friston et al., 2010). The theory assumes that
predictions cascade in top-down flows, from higher layers toward
lower ones. They are met by upcoming flows of information
that either match those predictions or not. The brain deals with
incoming information in a cost-efficient way by propagating
residual prediction errors in the system (rather than construing
a representation based on sensory input).
Predictive coding theories assume that the brain became wired
to run an inherently culture-dependent model of the world
that controls the body in cultural ecologies through predictive
processes (Gendron et al., 2020). Enactivists criticize such
predictive theories for their reliance on inner models or ‘priors’
as hypotheses. For them, these bear too much resemblance to
inner representations as central explanatory elements (Hutto,
2018; Hutto et al., 2020). Clark (2015a) sees his radical version
as being fit to oppose such a criticism, because it treats the brain
as mainly engaging dynamical loops through the environment
(with the external designer environments constraining these
loops, more on this in a bit). He claims that RPP further
alleviates explanatory weight from inner generative models (that
remain a central element in his theory) by spreading this weight
onto the ongoing interactions and the environmental structures
themselves.12 Along those lines it has been emphasized that one
way to reduce prediction error is to test the environment by
actively engaging with it, which falls under the concept of ‘active
inference.’ Here, the motor system can be described as part of
cognition in oculomotor control (for example) as well as in cued
and goal-directed movements (Friston et al., 2010; Adams et al.,
2013; Constant et al., 2020a).
Clark’s (2013) concept of designer environments
directly focuses on how material culture structures our
intersubjective take on the world. Public symbols are effectively
forcing upon us new regimes of pre-structured, re-entrant
information processing.
The same potent processing regimes, now targeting these brand
new types of statistically pregnant designer inputs, are then
enabled to discover and refine new generative models, latching
onto (and at times actively creating) ever more abstract structure
in the world. Action and perception thus work together to reduce
prediction error against the more slowly evolving backdrop of a
culturally distributed process that spawns a succession of designer
environments. (Clark, 2013, p. 195).
Clark mostly discusses lingua-form perceptuals that are
public, external models of the world (such as language, formula,
theories; Lupyan and Clark, 2015). Still, such a view can include
media, cultural artifacts, and the larger cultural environment to
support claims regarding artifact engagements (Constant et al.,
2020a,b). In the quoted passage, Clark’s focus is on cognition
and thought. By emphasizing how the structured environment
contributes to cognition, he aims to appease the worry that
predictive processing does not provide enough internal structure
to explain our full-blown cognitive architecture. Yet, what
he claims for the “abstract structures in the world” I would
argue also applies to the experimental regimes that media
present to us. Clark even references different media and
their material properties that limit our interaction space (e.g.,
computer-keyboard interfaces and specific video formats) that
12Clark argues that the actively inferencing organism is not decoupled from the
environment. It constantly updates its predictions or priors in a way that they no
longer resemble classical mental representations anymore (Clark, 2015b). Others
argue that an enactive account of predictive engagement (PE) should further
do away with inferences and models in the theory. Instead, it should directly
focus on the situation dynamics of the whole system along with concepts such
as “adjustment, attunement, and accommodation” (Gallagher and Allen, 2018).
I am greatly sympathetic to their version of predictive engagement, but do not
see it in strong opposition to my understanding of the RPP account presented
above. As part of my survey of 4E and related accounts, I have chosen to focus on
RPP because it is more directly geared to an understanding of media as designer
environments and could be seen as an extension of the extended mind views
developed earlier. In contrast, Gallagher and Allen (2018) focus on the dynamics
of social interaction.
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are nonetheless key to or cultural ecosystems (Clark, 2016,
p. 279–281). In this, they are a central part of the ever-
faster succession of designer environments. Media entrain our
perception-action cycles. Despite and precisely because they
thereby reduce the complexity of (embodied) interactions with
our surroundings they also enable us to engage in new and
potentially exciting explorations (as we will see with respect to
media works such as texts, films, etc.).
The PC framework sees perception as largely operating based
on generative models (conditioned probabilities that link data
to their hidden causes in the environment) in a top-down way.
These operations start with the inward layers of a hierarchical
model of the brain. RPP shares this basic assumption, but
it enables us to include cultural environments as part of the
predictions more systematically. The way the brain dovetails
with designer environments could render these environments
an outer layer of predictions themselves, generating their own
media-specific flow of information. One might still worry that
a separation of inner and outer processing is re-introduced,
rendering the environments as passive contributors to the inner
complex and active machinery. In this scenario, they would
function simply as input to the cognitive system.13 Another
worry is that the ‘free-energy minimization’ that is part of the
larger theory unifying biology and cognitive science introduces
an overgeneralization that contains the assumption that a system
should seek out states and therefore environments that would
contain no surprise (known as the “dark room problem,” Friston
et al., 2012). Media environments seem to present the opposite
of this. Although I do not believe that RPP can fully deal with
those worries on its own (for this the larger, more enactive picture
form above would be needed), I nonetheless will address some
answers from within the framework, because this also helps to
see more clearly how media environments could fit into the
predictive picture.
Active Media Inference
The first worry is that designer environments still seem separated
from making a central contribution to cognition. Neural
processing of generative models in hierarchical layers of the
brain supposedly does most of the work. This worry can be
partially assuaged by pointing to the role of action within the
active inference concept in RPP and the targeting of different
layers of generative models. As we have seen, a central way to
reduce uncertainty is to act upon the environment. This allows
for an enhanced hypothesis testing. Such a picture is alluring
because it can also capture the ways our actions in active inference
are pre-structured and limited in designer environments (and
media ecologies). It simultaneously addresses how the dovetailing
of brain-organism-artifact via this pre-structuring facilitates the
13The formal description of systems that engages with active inference (i.e.,
described within the boundaries of a Markov Blanket) could also include elements
outside the living organism. In this sense, it would be an outer layer of a nested
system (Kirchhoff et al., 2018). But without further explanation, such an outer
layer would still seem to remain at the periphery of what constitutes cognitive
engagement. What I try to argue is that we attune to external models at different
levels of our hierarchical generative model on the organismic side.
organism in engaging with the richness and potency of ecological
information.14
Once again, consider our brain at the movies and the case
of perception. Here, the visual system’s priors are not neutral
between many possibilities to engage. Rather, they operate within
a limited range of possibilities. In typical Hollywood cinema,
for example, we do not have to explore the scene presented
on our own: the director, camerawoman, and editor all direct
our attention to the salient part of the action. Our eye- and
head movements are thus cued (Loschky et al., 2015). In
such cases, activity independent of such cues (e.g., saccades
to different areas of the screen) would not be rewarded with
the relevant information that drives the story. Certain actions,
such as standing up and moving toward the screen, won’t yield
relevant visual feedback. Seeing to people engage in a movie
scene can thus be contrasted with perceiving a scene wherein
two people engage in the flesh. Once we have switched to the
regime of film (i.e., reduced uncertainty with respect to the more
global environment; enabling a specific set of generative models
and hyperpriors), we allocate resources to other elements we
would not necessarily focus on in real life (e.g., by enhancing
our emotional engagement in the close-up of a face). In this
scenario, active inference based on sensorimotor filmic priors
allow us to engage with an idea, character, and story in ways
that would not be available in the real world, especially because
certain actions within such a media ecology are reduced and
others are taken over by the medium (e.g., by zooming into
a scene). Film therefore constitutes its own generative (cause-
effect) model. Here, the presence of a medium that adheres to
certain regularities in conjunction with layers of neurons engaged
in the minimization of prediction error jointly manage the kind
of sensory flow within a media habit.
The degree of alignment with an environment that I just
described is, for example, captured by variations of “precision
weighing” that modulate the impact of error signals in specific
contexts (Clark, 2016, pp. 57–59). Precision weighing provides
a mechanism that plays a role in what we pay attention to
Feldman and Friston (2010); Parr and Friston (2017)—one that
has been employed to understanding “presence” in both media
and non-media contexts (Parola et al., 2016; Seth, 2019). Take
another example. Walking through a built environment (such
as an apartment, university, or city) renders certain kinds of
information more or less salient. This leads to greater precision,
and therefore less uncertainty, in embodied predictions about
certain elements. This is, for instance, expressed in a high
conditioned probability the streets in a city follow a grid-like
structure. Violations within such a geared prediction regime
will gain our attention more easily. RPP therefore provides an
organism-artifact mixed-media model that, in the end, could be
part of an explanation about why certain forms of attention or
affective engagement, etc. occur within a specific habit but can
be quite different in another media environment. Moreover, the
structure of the designed media environments co-constitutes our
engagements with generative models in the brain being geared to
pick up and integrate recurring patterns.
14But see Anderson and Chemero (2018).
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Culture as the Plurality of Mutual Models
Designer environments are thus centrally involved in eliciting
switches between generative models in the brain (or what could
be considered hyperpriors, such as when switching between
perceiving a picture and a social scene in the flesh). Even more
centrally, however, the external models co-determine the ways
in which multilevel, probabilistic models unfold deeply within
the engine of the human cognitive system. This view of the
cognitive system can therefore do without assuming that we have
to represent the structures of the media artifacts themselves.
Instead, the brain-body nexus jointly with the medium engages in
exploration. The first worry, that of a secondary contribution of
media-designs, is thus addressed to some extent. Still, the second
worry remains, namely that our engagement with “statistically
pregnant” designer environments does not seem to fit the general
aim of organisms to reduce uncertainty.
Regarding this second worry, I would like to steer clear from
discussions of a dark room that immediately presents itself as
an adaptively unreasonable and unsuccessful coping strategy that
leaves seekers of dark rooms at an evolutionary disadvantage
(it remains problematic that the theory might proposition such
a scenario). When it comes to artifacts and media, the more
relevant discussion is the perceived value of experiential surprise
(Van de Cruys and Wagemans, 2011; Seth, 2019). Predictive
Theories based on free-energy minimization do not seem to
account for the “deep, positive attractions of novelty, play, and
exploration” (Clark, 2018, p. 524). Clark discusses this in terms
of an “information theoretic subversion,” which is the idea that
we could describe a predictive system maximizing prediction
success (avoiding the dark room) and still end up with a
perfectly trivial sense in which the system achieves that. Such
subversions seem to be forestalled by the plurality and dynamics
of our cultural practices, artifacts, and media.15 They come to
us with new affordances for engagement, with a multitude of
complex traditions ready for exploration, and by implicating
novel epistemic actions.16 Such designer environments thereby
ensure “a steady diet of change, innovation, and challenge”
(Clark, 2018, p. 531).
This speaks directly to the aforementioned paradoxical aspect
of habits as sustaining certain ways of acting while, at the same
time, evolving to incorporate new forms of engagement (being
transformatively expansive). Habits seem to minimize novelty by
attuning us to a specific designer environments or media settings.
They are therefore conservative in the sense of providing and
keeping us within a range of viable actions. Yet since habits are
partially constituted by the pervasive artifacts that evolve around
us (they are locationally expansive in that media co-constitute
their exploration), they also can appear as more progressive.17
15Although, such subversion could be attributed to certain domains of our digital
media environment. Consider the rise of casual puzzle games such as Candy Crush
and Gardenscapes, which achieved 180 million downloads by 2018 (Katkoff, 2019).
Such games present players with successive puzzles of ever-so-slightly increasing
complexity.
16For the concept of epistemic action see Kirsh and Maglio (1994) and the
discussion in Clark and Chalmers (1998).
17Habits evolve and find new expressions in the succession of media forms
(reading, e.g., transitioned while its medium changed from handwritten texts,
We are exposed to a plurality of designer environments that we
co-construe and that still dynamically evolve. In engaging those
environments, our inner models and the outer models coalesce.
What is more, they become mutual models that span brain, body,
and environment, that are actively embodied, and which are
shared with others.
These are only cursory remarks. Still, RPP provides an initial
theory of how the brain folds media environments into our
expansive sense-making activities (with the caveat that it still
relies on inner models in ways enactive theorizing would object
to, see footnote 12). It claims that the brain-body system picks
and engages strategies for dealing with the world based on error
minimization and active inference. Media environments, in turn,
provide a plurality of strategies for dealing with the world via
experiential models, models that constitute the shared space of
culture and innovation.
A SHORT PRIMER ON MEDIA THEORY:
THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE
The current paper proposes understanding enculturation by
employing a theory about our embodied habits in relation to
external media. Here, habits are media-inclusive, temporally
outreaching, and governors of the dynamics of our engagement.
The premise is that media widen our senses and are central
conveyors of culture. Before I discuss how this account of
artifactual habits helps us tackle specific media engagements (see
section “Toward a New Cognitive Media Theory”), it is worth
taking a quick detour to see whether the central tenets of situated
cognition relate to a more general media theory.18
A seminal position within the admittingly diverse field of
media theory is McLuhan’s media ecology (McLuhan, 1962)
that still promises to evolve into exciting new directions (Lum,
2014). Media ecology probes the effects of anything we use in
dealing with the world around us. For instance, McLuhan even
includes lightbulbs as media. He does not focus solely on mass
communication, but on how media enable us to do things. By
his definition, media are extensions of the human body. They
span bodily functions ranging from basic needs to cognition. This
explains why McLuhan’s concept of media as “extensions of man”
includes housing and cities as extensions of bodily heat control
(McLuhan, 1964). This is obviously in addition to more classical
areas he touches upon such as TV and movies (which extend
our sensorimotor grasp) as well as the now-ubiquitous electronic
media that are seen as an extension of the human nervous system
(McLuhan, 1964, 1988).
to printed books, to current tablets devices) or they emerge as new habits of
engagement as in the case of more radical technical or artistic innovations (think,
again, of moving image devices).
18I do not aim to capture the multi-faceted field of media studies, the scope of
which goes well beyond this paper. One reason is because many accounts in media
studies combine cultural analysis and the philosophy of technology with normative
claims. This includes reflections on the tyranny of digital media and computational
thinking (Stiegler, 2019), the implications of the “neuro-image” in socio-political
terms (Pisters, 2017), and the aforementioned critical assessment of the attention
economy (Crogan and Kinsley, 2012).
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Three things are relevant here. First, one of the more
established distinctions in the amorphous field of media theory
is its relative separation from communication theory. The latter
predominantly focuses on the sender and the receiver, the
source, and the destination of messages. Where communication
theory describes what part of the message gets through (treating
disturbances in the media channel as noise), media theory aims
more directly at the media qualities of the given channel and the
way external devices record, process, and convey information.
Versions of communication theory based on Shannon and
Weaver’s (1949) information model already had their impact
on philosophy, such as in terms of the naturalization of
intentionality in representational theories of mind (Dretske,
1981; Adams, 2003). It stands to reason that media theory
could play a similar role within 4E cognition. Understanding
the mind requires more than a focus on what information gets
in. This understanding has to explain how mental states are
brought forth in embodied engagements that are based on the
cognitive practices I have described as joint explorations of
media and organisms.
Second, media theory provides a way to centrally understand
culture that spans technology and images, social engagement and
art (Bickenbach, 2011). At the same time, it captures the decisive
impact media have on the mind and the human sensorium
(Gane and Sale, 2007; Jones, 2010). In this, it complements
reconstructive evolutionary accounts of culture as social learning
in biology (Heyes, 2020) and cognitive neuroscience (Gendron
et al., 2020) by focusing on the aspects of learning and adaptation
that are mediated by media. The humanities background for
media theory could supply additional help in tracking the
concept of value or significance across different disciplines,
while also challenging conventional ways of thinking in the
cognitive sciences. As an enactive category, artifactual habits
involve more than just habituation. They decisively encompass a
capacity to generate, sustain, and track values in the environment.
Enculturation can then be understood as an extension of such
value systems: “culture thus concerns all forms of significance
that are common to groups of people and inherited by social
rather than genetic means” (Durt et al., 2017, p. 74). 4E-
supported media studies could explore enculturation by not
focusing solely on social interactions with others (Veissière
et al., 2019): it could instead achieve this by foregrounding the
cultural artifacts and media domains that centrally permeate and
structure our minds.
A third point, frequently made in media studies, is the claim
the impact of media is so pervasive and ubiquitous, their co-
constitutional role for our (cognitive) lives does not come to the
fore anymore. As Bourdieu (1977) developed with respect to the
concept of doxa (as opposed to the more explicit dogmas and
norms in a society), culture could be seen as all the things that
are taken for granted in a society. A theoretic effort is required to
make explicit the ways in which we are enculturated. The reign
media have over us is one that relates to their structural impact.
This is captured in McLuhan’s most famous phrase: “the medium
is the message” (McLuhan, 1964). In the sense of information
or content, no message can measure up to the effects of the
structural interaction enabled by the medium that carries the
content. This makes McLuhan’s observation a theoretical call to
the arms—one that extends to philosophy of mind that might be
prone to miss out on the potentially profound impacts of media.
It is therefore important to include a wide range of media and
cultural artifacts to understand this impact (as I do in the next
sections). While their impacts may not always be immediately
transparent, they nonetheless form an infrastructural basis for
experience and understanding.
TOWARD A NEW COGNITIVE MEDIA
THEORY
We saw that within a situated cognition perspective, some tenets
of a general media theory could also constitute tenets for a
philosophy of mind. Despite case studies in specific domains
such as the internet (Halpin et al., 2010; Smart et al., 2017;
Clowes, 2019), attempts to include a more general media theory
within situated cognition are sparse.19 In media theory, cognitive
media theory is most directly related to questions regarding the
kind of mental states we entertain in our media engagements.
These range from story engagements to aesthetic evaluations
(Nannicelli and Taberham, 2014). For the remainder of this
paper, I explore some media domains under its auspices. With
this exploration, I intend to put the proposed artifactual habits
account to work.
The Filmic Body Schema
In the 1980s, film studies took a naturalistic turn that challenged
the prevailing Big Theories of its time. The turn drew
more systematically on research from linguistics, anthropology,
evolutionary biology, psychology and neuroscience (Bordwell,
2013). The so-called ‘cognitive media theory’ claimed that the
widespread impact of cinema “must be connected to some
fairly generic features of human organisms to account for their
power across class, cultural, and educational boundaries. The
structures of perception and cognition are primary examples
of fairly generic features of humans” (Carroll, 1985, p. 92).
Filmmakers achieve their effects by eliciting emotions and
guiding our attention by story and character development—but
also by framing, camerawork, and editing. In this respect, movies
are attentional engines (Carroll and Seeley, 2013; Seeley, 2020).
Cognitive film theory never explicitly stated that it is committed
to a basic set of cognitive mechanisms. It nonetheless rests on a
fixed-properties view of the mind that the present paper wants
to challenge by providing a more integrative and dynamic theory
regarding our cognitive capacities.
An often-reported finding is the amount of viewer synchrony
during feature films. Through an inter-subject correlation
analysis of fMRI data from participants watching a movie (The
Good, the Bad, and the Ugly), Hasson et al. (2008) found an
exceedingly high convergence of activity. As other studies have
confirmed, such convergence is higher for edited film clips
compared to unedited ones (Herbec et al., 2015). This could
support the universalist claim of cognitive media theory because
19An exception is Logan (2013).
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it appears to establish the existence of generic features of the
human cognitive system that cinema plays to. Edited sequences
entrain us in their unfolding more than non-edited ones, as do
moving images more so than static pictures. The latter claim been
demonstrated with respect to “attentional synchrony” using eye-
tracking paradigms: compared to static scenes, sequences with
actions and movement generate greater attentional synchrony,
with respect to fixations and saccades in participants—especially
when tracking people and faces (Smith and Mital, 2013).
The general attentional synchrony for dynamic scenes has
indeed been exploited by film to hide its media features (e.g.,
camera movements or editing). Particularly for Hollywood
cinema, montage adheres to what has been labeled ‘continuity
editing’; these are shooting and editing rules aimed at creating
smooth, visual continuity in the eye of the beholder (Berliner
and Cohen, 2011). The rules include perspectives and camera
angles that can be assembled together before and after a cut (for
instance, one should remain within an angle of 180 degrees and
not go below 30 degrees). Often, the movement of an object
or person is preserved when there is a cut. This ensures that
such “match-action” cuts keep us entrained (Smith and Martin-
Portugues Santacreu, 2017). By employing these techniques, there
is a high propensity that our engagement with medium-specific
characteristics such as edits does not reach conscious awareness
anymore (Fingerhut, 2020b), or, at the very least, are subdued.
This is captured by a phenomenon called ‘edit blindness.’ 30
percent or more of cuts go unrecognized within a scene, even
when the viewer is tasked solely with reporting cuts in 5-min clips
from Hollywood blockbusters (Smith and Henderson, 2008).
From the perceptual cognitive neuroscience perspective, each
cut constitutes a significant event or violation of expectations.
The neural signature of a film cut resembles that of a syntactic
violation in language processing or in the order of sequence for
comic-like stories using static images (Magliano and Zacks, 2011;
Maffongelli et al., 2015). Let’s return to the cuts described above.
When comparing continuity edits to those that depart from
the rules, no significant differences in early visual or syntactic
processing were found. Instead, differences appear in brain areas
that process violation repair. In cases where such post-perceptual
updating is not occurring, other areas (such as those related to the
conscious processing in detection tasks) are found to have neural
signatures resembling those when a change is detected in a change
blindness paradigm (Heimann et al., 2017).
One interpretation of these findings is that the visual
entrainment to depicted elements (perhaps the movement of an
object or person before and after a continuity edit) is sufficient
to suppress conscious processing of cuts, allowing viewers to
engage with the scene. In non-continuity editing, those content-
related cues are simply insufficient to suppress awareness of
the filmic means.
Yet one could also argue that continuity editing only works
because it is integrated into a learned habit of enacting film. This
would mean editing recedes into the background (and escapes
our attention) only after we have developed a pictorial, moving-
image competence. First, we must have had some exposure
to edited film. Only once we have incorporated our filmic
explorations (through camera and editing) into an artifactual
habit of perceiving, may we stop perceiving these discrete
configurational elements as independent elements, or events.
Indeed, there is some experimental support for such a view. First-
time viewers of film do have trouble perceiving spatiotemporal
continuity in a scene that is put together adhering classic editing
rules. Due to cuts and perspectival changes, such viewers do not
perceive what is depicted before and after the cut as one and the
same object (Ildirar and Schwan, 2015; Ildirar and Ewing, 2018).
One explanation for this is that first-time viewers perceive cuts
as a strong distortion—not just as a perspectival shift displaying
the same scene. The flipside of this is experienced viewers of
film have integrated such violations as part of film viewing and
have developed a filmic habit of engagement. This then can
be seen as one element of a filmic habit that comes with its
own sensorimotor rules or even body schema (Fingerhut and
Heimann, 2017). And it is only within such a filmic body schema
that we can explain how attention and emotions are employed
while experiencing a story in a way that captures what makes our
engagement special in such cases.20
The present paper assembles phenomena from different media
domains, thereby exploring how best our cognitive engagement
may be described. This includes focusing on how external media
and neural processing should be combined in terms of the
realization base of mental states as well as focusing on enactive
sense-making and the habits that structure such sense-making
in different media ecologies (with habits constituting a central
level of description in 4E media theory). I furthermore argue that
predictive theories could fit neatly into this picture, for they can
explain how we engage with media works (e.g., what predictions
we bring to bear when we, for instance, watch a melodrama, a TV
crime series, a horror movie, or read a novel). The more radical
version of predictive processing discussed may additionally
capture how we share into the explorative world-models designer
environments present us, rendering them mutual models.
I am not aware on any substantive work on predictive coding
and film. Nevertheless, there are interesting attempts to apply
predictive models to works of literature, namely by treating
literary texts as probability designs (Kukkonen, 2014, 2020).
Generally, Kukkonen argues that literature engages in enhanced
interoceptive explorations, referring to claims that inferences
in hierarchical PC encompass exteroceptive and interoceptive
prediction errors alike (Seth, 2013). Since the medium (in this
instance, texts) limits our range of actions within a media
environment, it makes specific elements more salient, allowing
us to further explore affective evaluations of our inner realms that
might otherwise go unrealized. Predictions here unfold on several
levels, the most important one addressing narrative and plot.
Given my focus on sensorimotor and body-schematic processes,
I am more interested in the embodied reading experience and
the designed sensory flow in such engagements. Here, form
emerges as the central concept. Form, which is “foregrounded
in the designed sensory flow of the sentences[,] sparks epistemic
active inference, but arguably [it] also [serves] as [an anchor]
20While continuity editing therefore holds some interest to film studies, it also is
too limited in its purview. Film scholars aim instead to understand how editing
mediates the emotional and Gestalt perception within our filmic habit of engaging
(Pearlman, 2017).
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in the text to return to” (Kukkonen, 2020, p. 189). Because
real-world bodily engagement is attenuated in reading, literary
structures and formal elements can channel sensory flow in
media-specific ways. On this point, compare how, in film, both
editing and camera work scaffold our immersion and determine
our engagement. However, the ability to return to those specific
anchors earlier in the film experience is largely precluded.
Therefore our self-initiated embodied engagement might be even
more reduced compared to literature (in which we could, e.g.,
saccade or scroll back to earlier passages in the text). In engaging
a filmic body schema under cinematic conditions we surrender
our motor activity to the medium. This therefore constitutes a
different trade-off between extero- and interoception by contrast
with literature.
Seeing-In Pictures
The discussion of body schemas and pictures can also be couched
in a broader question: what is the main difference with respect
to the skills and habits that we bring to bear in pictorial
perception compared to those we employ in the real world?
Let’s consider, for a moment, static images such as drawings,
paintings, and photos. Such pictures are peculiar kinds of objects.
I have argued elsewhere (Fingerhut, 2014, 2020a; Fingerhut
and Heimann, 2017) that pictures (i) afford specific epistemic
operations, that they are (ii) affective objects that can address
us in powerful ways, and (iii) that via exposure and experience-
based learning, we develop an artifact-specific perceptual manner
of engagement with them. The latter aligns mostly with the topic
of the present paper. To properly address our pictorial habits
of perceiving, consider again the insight from enactive sense-
making: cognizers must actively bring forth experiences. Enacting
what we experience takes a different turn when we engage with
pictures. The reason for this becomes obvious when we think
about the sensorimotor patterns involved. Changing our position
relative to the picture, for instance, does not allow us to see
behind a depicted object. Pictures and depicted objects thus
provide their own—and sometimes paradoxical—experiences of
presence (Noë, 2012; Seth, 2019). Material pictures afford a
different kind of exploration with respect to what is depicted
(their content) and with respect to the properties of their surfaces
(their configurational features). But most crucially, we experience
a surface-content relation when we see a picture. In fact, it has
been argued that perceiving pictures is constituted by engaging
such a surface-content interaction; it relies on the cognitive
operation of seeing-in that comes with the phenomenology of a
twofold experience (Wollheim, 1980/2015; Hopkins, 2003; Lopes,
2003). To perceive something in a picture, we have to engage with
its configurational and with its representational properties. Both
jointly constitute the experience.
The intricacies of the philosophical debate regarding seeing-in
are not relevant for the present paper as the point I would like
to make is more general. It seems obvious here that perception
of the surfaces of pictures and perception of what is depicted
afford different sensorimotor operations. Yet it is the interaction,
parallel processing, or integration of the two operations within
the habit of picture perception, in particular, that must be better
understood. This, strangely enough, is largely ignored in the
cognitive sciences that use pictures as stimuli and even the field
of neuroaesthetics (Fingerhut, 2018b).
Consider embodied simulation accounts that highlight motor
responses as a necessary feature of our engagement with pictures
such as paintings (Freedberg and Gallese, 2007). They focus
on body postures, implied actions, and the facial expressions
of depicted human figures on the one hand, and on premotor
areas responding to perceived brushstrokes or cuts of the
canvas on the other (Umilta’ et al., 2012; Sbriscia-Fioretti et al.,
2013). Nonetheless, they do not explore how both folds of our
cognitive processing (i.e., of surface and content) interact in our
engagement with a painting. That is, they do not show how
the parallel motor processing of surface and content features
determine our experiences in such cases.21 I do not believe this
is a minor point: if our perceptual habit of picture perception
is defined by this double processing, then this is a necessary
complication for any theory of pictorial engagement (Fingerhut,
2018a). This last point more generally attests to the need to
study habits as a unit rather than as something constituted by
disjointed processes. In order to understand picture perception,
the intertwined processing of configuration and content afforded
by those artifacts has to be taken into account.
It has been argued that film does not have a surface in the same
way other pictures have and that therefore there is no seeing-
in with respect to film (Cavell, 1979; Carroll, 1996). This can be
illustrated by the central role of sensorimotor engagement with
the surface of a handmade painting: moving toward a painting
makes the brushstrokes more visible and might contribute to the
central experience of the artwork (Currie, 2018). This does not
occur in the same way with the surface on which film is shown,
such as a projection screen in cinema. Nonetheless, there is good
reason to extend the notion of seeing-in to moving images and the
many screen-based digital media containing them. Also in film
we interact with configurational features (edits, camera, and lens
movements) and the evolving content simultaneously. As with
representational static images, any account of our filmic habits
would have to integrate this double engagement and explain how
film actively guides our exploration through specific moving-
image strategies (Fingerhut, 2020b).
Such a focus could constitute one way to complement the
more generic features of our cognitive apparatus described in
cognitive media theory. Yet it should come as no surprise that
also other expansions of cognitive engagements through the
medium of film have been explored in the literature. One example
is empathy. It has been argued that film affords expansive
empathic engagement by providing close-ups that, for instance,
enable us to engage more intensely with the faces of depicted
characters. This engagement facilitates a better understanding
of people from what could be considered outgroups and to
which we otherwise would not develop such an involvement.
21Embodied simulation accounts of pictures and pictorial artworks have been
criticized for relying on inner representations as mediating such experiences and
therefore not being properly embodied (Gallagher, 2011). I will not go into the
details of this discussion here. But I believe that a more enactive understanding of
the role of the motor system as involved in preparation for actions, as Gallagher
suggests, might preserve some of the insights of the embodied simulation theory
of the arts (Fingerhut, 2018b).
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Smith (2012),BR171 discusses this within a 4E framework by
referring to the aforementioned embodied simulation accounts
(motor simulation of facial mimicry and observed actions).
Embodied simulation functions as a mediator to enhance our
engagement with characters that we would not have the same
access to under normal conditions.
The kind of motor activity described by Smith is seen as
having the domain-general function of facilitating empathy. Film
thus expands some of the features (through close-ups of faces,
gestures, etc.) we can pick up on as well as the class of organisms
or objects (marginalized groups, aliens, robots, villains, etc.)
to which we allot this kind of empathy. This is important in
of itself. But what I want to add is that Smith’s application
of motor theories of empathy still relies on a bio- or socio-
chauvinistic interpretation of neural activity. As I have argued
above, such a view needs to be amended by a focus on the
neuromedial elements that are part of the larger, structural way
a movie recruits and engages the cognitive apparatus within our
filmic habit. Motor activity is also modulated by filmic features
such as camera movements and edits (Heimann et al., 2014,
2019) and therefore configurational features of the medium. We
have to take into account how these have been incorporated
into our ways of exploring a scene in film. This is what a
new cognitive media theory should capitalize on. So in terms
of the motor-empathy framework discussed in the preceding
paragraphs, one could speak of “empathy with the medium”—
one that not only includes the depicted persons or the stylistic
means of film independent of each other, but centrally the
integrated seeing-in habits related to moving images (i.e., the
interplay of configuration and recognition in our engagement of
film, see Fingerhut, 2020b). Any neural activity, and especially
the neuromedial side of the larger artifactual habit, would have
to be interpreted with respect to such normal conditions of
film perception.
Digital and New Media
Pictures and moving images are intimately woven into recent
digital revolutions. Concepts such as post-cinema or trans-
and intermediality in storytelling capture only some of ways
that images migrate or are processed therein. The presence
of screen-based media is permanent both as portable devices
and stable within our environment. Data from our interactions
with such interfaces are fed back into what is presented on
them (think of data-mining artificial intelligence in social
media). The term ‘new media’ largely designates the field of
social media, sometimes including the devices and gadgets
used to engage with this particular media. But it also marks
something that is akin to all media and fits the third notion
of expansiveness from above: “by changing the conditions for
the production of experience, new media destabilize existing
patterns of biological, psychical, and collective life even as
they furnish new facilities” (Hansen, 2010, p. 173). In this
sense, old new media (the emergence of cave paintings, the
printing press) might already reveal many things that can
be applied to more recent new media as well (Manchovic,
2001), and could also help us understand our intensely digitally
mediated environments.
In the expansive habits view I have proposed, new and digital
media are interesting for many reasons. Such media create
enhanced dynamics due to parallel available and transmedia
ecologies that require an additional focus on the meta-habit
of switching between multiple platforms, formats, and devices.
However, I will focus on two central points only. First, digital
media are not disembodied media. Their interfacing devices
exploit existing embodied engagements by aiming to be more
seamlessly integrated than other media have been to date.
Second, media devices evolve in rapid reciprocal adjustments
with users. Now, there are even media set-ups that employ
real-time feedback loops and real-time adjustment to the
organism. This relates to the growing domain of pervasive
and ubiquitous computing in the background of our world
(Lyytinen and Yoo, 2002) and to the algorithms and artificial
intelligence (AI) used to predict our interests (as evidenced by
various functions on Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, TikTok, and
so on). Such predictive activity emanating from the backend
of media corresponds with the concept of neuromediality in
an interesting way. Now, this concept denotes the neural
contribution within a habit not only on the side of the
organism but is also employed within the external medium
itself. Today, media environments themselves operate under
neural regimes.
Coming back to the first point I want to highlight. This
involves embodied routines of interaction and the ways our
bodily gestures (as well as those related to older media
artifacts) became integrated into novel interfaces. Think of
our use of touchscreens via gestures. A small but important
point in this respect is that even such seemingly seamless
devices do nonetheless require specific media skills (and related
sensorimotor and body-schematic processes).
This has been demonstrated by developmental psychology
and research into the so-called ‘video deficit effect,’ or the
ability to transfer learned content from 2D to 3D to real-
life-situations. Such transfer ability is relatively poor in infants
(Anderson and Pempek, 2005). This means that media skills
cannot be immediately applied in a domain-general way
and as easily be transferred between media and outside the
media context.
Recently, this kind of research has been extended to study
what it means to grow up in new digital environments (Barr,
2019). Touchscreen devices appear to provide more interactive
opportunities that should make transfer to 3D worlds outside the
media context more immediate. Yet transfer deficits nonetheless
remain also for touch screens. For example, children who learn
to press buttons on a 2D touchscreen cannot use this skill with
respect to 3D objects as immediately as one might expect (Zack
et al., 2009). The overall point of such findings is that despite a
general ability to transfer recognition and action skills between
media, or between media and the real world, such transfers often
come at a cost, such as additional cognitive load (Zack et al.,
2013). While such a load seems to be neglectable and often
remains unnoticed in adults, studies with infants provide some
support for the claim that media habits require their own rules
of engagement, even in media that seem to have adapted to the
human motor-sensorium.
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The second aforementioned aspect refers to the content and
configuration of new digital media being adjusted in ever-
shorter timescales (up to real time) to their users. A common
example is learning software that adapts to the skillset of its
user. Likewise, our choices determine the content portrayed
to us in social media. Such responsive feedback is also at the
heart of the concept of enactive media (Tikka, 2010a; Kaipainen
et al., 2011). The structurally interesting features of such media
is that they pick up on our actions and physiology and adjust
their feedback accordingly. The authors describe one specific
filmic media setting in which “technology is a part of a two-way
feedback system with self-controlling recursive properties, and
the role of an interface becomes implicit, perhaps even to the
degree of being non-conscious” (Kaipainen et al., 2011, p. 433).
The relevant cinema installation includes a montage machine
unit that recombines elements from a database into cinematic
composition based on psycho-physical data from the viewer (see
also Tikka, 2010b). This makes the viewer the unconscious author
of their media content.
Despite the focus on cinematic narrative, the discussion of
enactive media has a more general relevance. For one, it makes
explicit the possibility of new media systems to attune their user
in real-time by in future also more systematically mining their
physiological and neural data. For another, it simultaneously
limits cognitive access to the interface of such adjustments. Much
more could be said about whether enactive media introduce a
new dynamicism from the artifact side, or whether they simply
demonstrate more clearly how media always have entrained
and transformed us. I included them in the present paper to
demonstrate that a new cognitive media theory must not simply
highlight media-specific abilities (artifactual habits beyond the
generic cognitive abilities addressed by cognitive media theory).
It must also address the dynamic reciprocal influences of
organism and media environments, which both enactivism
and RPP have made salient. Such dynamics might include a
highly adaptive (and thus neuromedially predictive) element on
the media artifact side as well. This element could change
the character of media-related habits that already encompass
artifact and organism (a I aimed to capture by the concept
of locational expansiveness). Such neuromedial elements on the
artifact side renders organism and media artifacts ever more
intimately interwoven.
Architecture and Cities
Media have been treated as extensions of our bodies. McLuhan’s
media cases thus include buildings and cities, which are viewed
as extensions of our metabolic system. But the built environment
structures cognition and actions on a multitude of levels; it
affects us continuously across all of our senses from vision to the
vestibular, from touch to sound. We create our reality as we move
through designed space. The impact of architecture and design
remains a largely understudied field in philosophy and cognitive
science. This is certainly true compared to study of language,
but also compared to study of pictures and even computation
and digitalization. Still, things have started to shift due in part
to scholarly interest in the possible convergence of embodied
cognition paradigms and architectural studies (Mallgrave, 2013;
Pallasmaa et al., 2015; Robinson and Pallasmaa, 2017).
Currently, half of the world’s population lives in densely
populated urban areas. This portion is projected to rise above
two thirds of the population by 2050. Recent studies have
explored correlations between cities and mental health, noting
that the risks for anxiety disorders and psychotic disorders
such as schizophrenia might be significantly higher in cities
(Gruebner et al., 2017; but see DeVylder et al., 2018). It thus
seems pressing to study the impact of architecture and city
planning, along with general urban cognitive ecosystems, on
mental well-being, cognition, and experience. Some emerging
fields, such as neurourbanism, do so (Adli et al., 2017; Fett et al.,
2019). Essentially, the built environment is the ultimate designer
environment for our embodied minds to fold into their cognizing
and experiencing. This is because it is such a determining factor
across a wide range of bodily actions.
It is worth briefly considering the constant and stabilizing
influence of the built environment on our habits of engagement.
Due to its continuous presence, we might overlook its impact.
This would render architecture-related perceptual engagements
a human constant that is no longer a visibly part of an
artifactual habit. Still, there are some indications of how the
built environment might have permeated our perception. One
example is the Müller-Lyer illusion (which portrays two lines
of equal length as different lengths to the human vision, thanks
to fins at the end of the line protruding either outwards or
inwards). The illusion appears to be universal. For instance, it
is present in children who gain sight after congenital blindness
(Gandhi et al., 2015). Yet the size of the effect is not universal.
It has been smaller for Navajo native Americans who grew up
in traditional roundhouses compared to those who grew up
in new reservation architecture (Pedersen and Wheeler, 1983;
Phillips, 2019). This has been related to a the ‘carpentered world
hypothesis’. The rationale is that we perceive lines with fins
protruding outwards as being at the back of a room (or of
something else in our carpentered worlds). They appear enlarged
in our perception because the visual system compensates for them
being seemingly further away.
Other studies have focused on the impact of navigation in
cities on our cognitive system. In a seminal study on experience-
driven neuroplasticity, taxi drivers in London showed greater
gray matter volume in the mid-posterior hippocampi compared
to bus drivers who do not have to exhibit the same navigational
skills (Maguire et al., 2006). A more general exploration of the
navigational capacities of 442,195 participants across 38 countries
by the same lab found participants raised in cities had worse
navigation skills than those raised in more rural areas. The effect
was larger for cities that had a geometric grid layout compared to
more organic and complex ones (Coutrot et al., 2020). The taxi
driver data reflects a task-driven plasticity, while the city-rural
comparison shows more generally how an environment recruits
its organisms and then alters their cognitive capacities. The data
therefore indicate that statistical immersion to an environment
alters our embodied, cognitive habits and that organisms allocate
neuronal processing resources (and undergo structural changes)
according to the demands of their environments.
The co-dependency and reciprocal shaping of architectural
and human embodiment also happens over smaller and dynamic
timescales (Jelić et al., 2016). The stable presence of architectural
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elements has a corollary effect (in keeping with the effects
of precision weighing in PP discussed above) wherein small
changes have rather big impacts. A central architectural element
are entrances and doors that afford locomotive permeability.
They have been, for instance, explored in EEG experiments that
measure motor preparation in the perception of such apertures,
which showed a highly fine-tuned sensitivity to this particular
architectural element (i.e., whether a door is walk-through-able
or not, see Djebbara et al., 2019, 2021). Such adjustments are part
of our architectural, multisensory habit to perceive architectural
affordances. Within such sensorimotor engagements, we can
understand how our experience of the built environment unfolds.
Here, we pick up on a multitude of design decisions and
architectural features in a dynamic way.22
After the initial interest from McLuhan (1964, 1988), buildings
and cities did not become a central concern for media theory
(but see Kittler and Griffin, 1996). As multisensory and mixed
media environments, cities and architecture have re-entered the
media theory landscape only recently (McQuire, 2008). Part of
the reason for their return is the rise of ubiquitous and pervasive
computing in smart cities. Artificial intelligence, the Internet
of Things, and large-scale data analytics are now employed to
predict and influence behavior. In this context, “architecture
provides a fixed form for the flows engineered by pervasive
computing” (McCullough, 2007, p. 395). Social media for city
experiences (Molinillo et al., 2019) and sensory feedback loops
in buildings might themselves become a central part of what we
consider architecture in the future as they latch onto our already
artifactual habits of engagement.
This section has described how artifactual habits relating
to urban and architectural design entrain our perceptual
engagement and determine cognitive capacities. The built
environment presents us with experiential models in ways that
are comparable to other media. Design decisions and urban
planning provide different models for how we may live together.
They influence urban dwellers in terms of their social behavior
or explorations of their environment. By focusing on how design
decision nudge us in cities and buildings (even without their
‘smart’ extensions), those cities could be described as media.
They process, store, and transmit information, yet over longer
timescales compared to other media. At the same time, they are
projections of the kind of social being that a certain culture aims
to produce and promote (for some critical implications of this,
see Crippen and Klement, 2020). As such, architecture and the
built environment are models of who we are (have been and will
be) as a society.
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Media environments and technologies evolve with our embodied
brain-body nexus in reciprocal co-adaptations. In this, they
22This can be illustrated by the impact of sound within the built environment. For
example, sonic feedback from our own movements (manipulated to low vs. high
pitch) can influence how large or heavy we experience our body to be (Tajadura-
Jiménez et al., 2015). This demonstrates our capacity for multisensory, fine-tuned
adjustment based on normal conditions within an architectural habit.
constantly reconfigure and transform how we engage and
experience. I have aimed to capture some of these dynamics
by highlighting the expansive artifactual habits we entertain
(because we live in a built environment, among a plethora
of pictures, and now are immersed in new digital media that
respond dynamically to us). I have mainly discussed media
artifacts from pictorial domains at the omission of other elements
or mixed media environments (such as sound and spoken
language, texts, and how those are interwoven and interact
with pictures) because I see images as underrepresented in
the discussion of the relation of culture and mind. But I also
aimed at a more general point: media in all their ramifications
should occupy a central place within the still-maturing field of
situated cognition.
I have therefore focused on a rather general concept in
the philosophy of mind, namely habits (Caruana and Testa,
2020). With this, I sought to capture the basic insight into the
relational nature of our mind propagated by 4E and enculturation
theories alike: our mind is crucially determined by the embodied
actions afforded by our socio-techno-cultural environments. As
I introduced them, habits are critical qualifiers of the range of
such actions within a specific ecology. In media ecologies, we
are expert perceivers without knowing it. The way we explore
the contents of different media is couched in habits that are
partially constituted by the structural features of the media
artifacts themselves. They are not rigid mechanical routines.
Instead, habits are flexible ways of world-making.
I have only briefly tapped into the rich and evolving
field of media studies by highlighting some general claims
regarding media archeology and ecology. More specifically, I have
addressed the way cognitive media theory captures our media
engagement. Although this media theory has recently started to
include ideas from situated cognition, I suggest that there are
limitations to this account. In comparison, the pluralistic and
dynamic view of artifactual habits (along with the interlocking of
media and neuro-cognitive architecture) in my enactive account
of media constitutes a larger shift in thinking. This shift might
warrant the label of new cognitive media theory. Regardless, it
entails acknowledgment of the plurality of habits and related
bodily engagements (I discussed the filmic body schema we
entertain when engaging with the pervasive artifact of moving
images, as well as the capacity of seeing-in that pertains to all
pictorial domains). It further offers an ensuing understanding
of how our perceptual, emotional, and aesthetic engagement
unfolds within such habits based on new insights into our
cognitive apparatus.
No survey of situated or 4E accounts can be exhaustive.
The field has evolved so rapidly that one is liable to
miss out on developments even for subdomains like media
engagement, which – unduly to my mind – are treated only
at its periphery (I am, for instance, well-aware that I largely
ignored phenomenological and post-phenomenological thinking
regarding media). I aimed to capture some central junctures to
the artifactual habits account of media I propose. Thus, I aimed
to re-territorialize extended mind claims to sociocultural media-
ecologies while retaining some of their focus on mixed-media
coalitions within habits. I did not focus on the ontological claims
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related to this. Instead, I proposed an enactive understanding
of how cultural artifacts have become integrated into our
cognitive routines. As central element, they do so by bringing
forth experiences in domains that sustain their own rules and
values. I argued that radical predictive processing (RPP) could
provide an accompanying explanation of how the nervous system
facilitates organism-artifact coalitions and how we attune to
design environments on multiple levels.
Our ability to engage with a plurality of designed media
models captures something central and defining in human
cognizing and experiencing. Once we understand the expansive
artifactual habits that bring forth novel meanings and values,
we can understand how our mind is mediated and becomes re-
mediated at every moment of being engaged with such models.
RPP served to situate the more local neuronal contribution
within this larger picture; it elucidates a possible role of
the brain in folding designed, media environments into our
embodied engagements. Further, the concept of neuromediality
captures some of this. It brings into focus the exapted functions
certain neuronal processes might take on in different media
ecologies. As such, neuromedial processes are part of the normal
conditions of any media engagement. In recent digital media
developments, neuromedial processes could even be ascribed
to media themselves (as we saw with respect to the real-time
dynamics of adapting and predicting their users).
This paper aimed to contribute to a broader understanding
of enculturation in situated cognition by focusing on how we
actively bring forth experiential models of the world that become
salient through and within media. It did not address what could
be considered our aesthetic relations to such cultural artifacts.
Media and cultural artifacts actively invite our exploration of the
world. They also invite evaluation of their ways of worldmaking.
Aesthetic and emotional appreciation might be a central way
to track the bundles of perceptual, cognitive, and other effects
presented to us by cultural artifacts (I explore such relations
elsewhere, see Fingerhut, 2018b; Fingerhut and Prinz, 2020,
forthcoming). Aesthetic evaluations of specific media outputs
relate to normative claims. This poses a threat to a more
comprehensive convergence between the humanities element in
media studies and naturalistic explanations in the 4E cognitive
sciences (Nannicelli, 2019). Future research will have to address
this. One promising way could be to explore what the present
paper has established as the more general value-generating
enactive view of habits and the affective dimension of the
respective media models this entails.
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